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Abstract
We explore the use of expert witnesses in arbitration proceedings by analyzing public procurement
contract disputes in Italy. Balancing cost with accuracy, participants to a contract select arbitration when
speedy dispute resolution is valued highly. Arbitration mechanisms tend to give arbitrators discretion in
how to proceed. Consequently, principal-agent problems can arise. Using an IV approach, we show that
the use of an expert witness causes a slowing down of the case resolution, without having an effect on
the outcome of the dispute nor resolving uncertainty as measured by unanimous decisions by the panel
of arbitrators.
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Introduction

Disputes arise as a normal consequence of economic exchange. Throughout history societies have developed
conflict resolution mechanisms to deal with these problems.1 Modern governments create legal institutions
as a public service. Regarding best mechanism design, there are numerous normative dimensions to consider.
One important consideration is accuracy. While identifying a dispute’s correct outcome is challenging, an
institution that includes available evidence, uses professional representatives, and applies equally to all can
be expected to lead to better outcomes. On the other hand, disputes are costly and the mechanisms created
to resolve these disputes adds further costs. These costs not only include the monetary costs, such as fees
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and lawyer expenses, but also arise from the opportunity cost of delay. A balance between accuracy and
cost must be struck.2
As the private marginal values on accuracy and cost likely vary across market participants, a public system
of dispute resolution cannot be expected to satisfy all. Consequently, parties not too infrequently seek out
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Arbitration is especially popular. Clauses within many types of
contracts pre-commit the two sides to use arbitration to resolve any conflict that may arise. Parties who
put more weight on cost mitigation are expected to prefer arbitration instead of using the publicly-provided
courts.
One noteworthy example of this is contracts in Italy. The Italian courts are notorious for the backlog
and delay. For example, the European Union measures the efficiency of courts across Europe. For the time
needed to resolve civil and commercial disputes, Italy ranks last on the continent taking approximately
550 days on average to resolve such as case. This is more than a year longer than Germany for example
[European Commission, 2019].3 This can be harmful. For one, payment for services provided is withheld.
Suppliers, though, incurred the costs to performing the contract and, hence, risk insolvency. Further, completion of performance can be halted due to the dispute. If a dispute arises during the construction of a
building, for example, the timeline to completion can be put on hold. The purchaser loses out on the use of
the building and the contractor has its labor’s and equipment’s use delayed. Hence, many contracts include
the use of arbitration to provide a fast resolution.4
Here, we obtain access to a database of public procurement contract disputes in Italy. Many public works
projects are outsourced to private contractors and the legal setting to resolve disputes that arise with these
contracts has evolved over the years (see overview below). Since 2006, with the transposition of EU directives
on public procurement into national law, the disputes at the execution phase of contracts can be resolved
by arbitration under the supervision and support of the Chamber of Arbitration set up within the Italian
anti-corruption authority known as the ANAC. Quite a bit of leverage is given to the individuals selected as
arbitrators in choosing how to manage the proceedings. Importantly, they chose whether to involve outside
experts. We argue that this opens up the possibility of principal-agent problems. While the participants
selected to use arbitration to (presumably) quicken the process, the arbitrators may not necessarily put a
premium on speed and, instead, put more weight on accuracy (or could benefit financially from a more drawn
out dispute that increases the arbitrator’s fees).
We argue that one important decision that affects the speed at which arbitration resolves disputes is the
choice to use an expert witness. For public procurement contracts, individuals can be employed to estimate
2 There are, of course, other normative considerations as well. Arbitration can provide private, rather than public, resolution
of disputes. Formal court rulings, on the other hand, can contribute to precedence creation and act as a guide for future, similar
transactions that reduce the overall level of disputes.
3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/justice scoreboard 2019 en.pdf
4 In fact, the European Scorecard shows that Italy has experienced the most dramatic reduction in the number of new civil
and commercial cases that are filed in the public courts. The number of new cases has reduced by approximately 40% between
2010 and 2017. This contrasts with most other European countries who have experienced only negligible decreases (and for
some, increases) in the number of cases entering the public courts.
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costs, provide relevant information on construction practices, or weigh in on legal rules and procedural norms.
The use of experts is optional. Ashenfelter and Dahl [2012] have commented previously on the use of experts
in labor-management contract disputes arguing that a Prisoner’s Dilemma is created. Fees must be paid to
these experts, which can help one side in the labor dispute. They show, though, that if both sides employ
experts the dispute’s costs escalate without a measurable impact on the outcome observed. For arbitration
mechanism,s such as what is used for public procurement contracts in Italy, the decision to bring in an
expert comes from the arbitrators appointed to the dispute. We explore, from a principal-agent perspective,
whether the use of experts adds to the delay. If so, then this would complement the escalated financial costs
documented by Ashenfelter and Dahl [2012]. Rather than this inefficiency arising from a Prisoner’s Dilemma
problem between the disputants, the deadweight loss we identify arises from the principal-agent problem
created by arbitrator discretion.
We use the set of public procurement contract disputes resolved in Italy between 2007 and 2020. Following
an instrumental-variables approach, we explore the causal effect of using an expert. Our primary finding is
that the expert’s use dramatically increases the duration of the case (i.e., number of days between the filing
of the dispute and its resolution). Further, we are unable to document any other change in the outcomes of
the disputes. The determination of the arbitral award is unaffected by an expert’s use and the likelihood that
the panel of arbitrators reaches a unanimous decision is unaltered. Thus, the use of experts does not affect
the outcome or its uncertainty, but does delay the process. If alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are
intended as an option for participants who put a premium on cost reduction, rather than focusing primarily
on accuracy, then institutional designers should consider addressing the principal-agent concerns created by
discretion in the proceedings.
There is a plentiful literature exploring both theoretically and empirically the consequences of specific
institutional features used in arbitration mechanisms. A primary concern has been contrasting conventional
arbitration where the arbitrator is free to make any award desired to final-offer arbitration where the arbitrator is bound to select one of the two final offers made by the disputants [Farber, 1980, Ashenfelter
and Bloom, 1984]. Experimental research has compared mechanisms [Deck et al., 2007a,b]. The effect of
strategic information transmission during the final-offer arbitration process has received quite a bit of attention [Farmer and Pecorino, 1998, 2003, 2013]. Marselli et al. [2015] consider the consequences of the use
of a panel of arbitrators, rather than a sole arbitrator, on settlement rates. Even the mechanism used to
select the arbitrators has been considered [Bloom and Cavanagh, 1986]. We contribute by exploring the
use of expert witnesses. As mentioned, we complement the analysis of Ashenfelter and Dahl [2012] who
remark on the Prisoner’s Dilemma nature to disputants choosing whether to hire experts to support their
case. Here, we evaluate the principal-agent problem that arises if the arbitrators are given discretion to
use outside experts.5 While Ashenfelter and Dahl [2012] show that the arbitral award is unaffected when
both sides employ experts, we show that both uncertainty amongst the arbitrators and the ultimate award
5 Webb and Wagar [2018] evaluate an expedited arbitration mechanism used in Canadian labor-management disputes and
show that it quickens the dispute’s resolution.
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is unaffected, but the duration of the dispute is extended.

2

Public Procurement Contracts & Arbitration in Italy

Public procurement contracts in Italy are regulated by the Public Contract Code of 2006 (hereafter PCC)
modified into the New Public Contract Code (NPCC) in 2016. In line with the European Directives, the
NPCC establishes rules for procurement by contracting authorities (hereafter CAs).
When awarding public contracts, CAs can choose ordinary procedures or, conditional upon the occurrence
of specific requirements, special procedures. The former can be either open (i.e., any interested party may
submit a tender in response to a call for competition) or restricted. In case of public contracts below the
European monetary thresholds, CAs may skip ordinary procedures and use instead direct award or negotiated
procedures with a minimum number of bidders.
As a consequence, public procurement contracts involving municipal governments/CAs and private enterprises/EOs will have contracts that are formed using ordinary, open procedures or special, restricted
processes.
The PCC set up the Autorità per la vigilanza sui lavori pubblici (hereafter ANAC), an independent
administrative authority regulating procurement and implementing anticorruption policy. Importantly, it
provides a number of services including those of the Chamber of Arbitration.
For public procurement contracts, the NPCC allows arbitration as an ordinary litigation remedy alternative to trial before a court. To do so the CA shall indicate in the call for tender the intention to adopt
an ex ante arbitration clause. Ex-post arbitration agreements are forbidden. When a dispute arises each
party nominates the arbitrator of its choice from among professionals with special expertise on the the topic
of the contract. The third arbitrator (i.e., the Chairman of the arbitration panel) shall be chosen by the
parties from among professionals that are not only experienced but also independent and have not served as
party-appointed arbitrator or lawyer in arbitral proceedings regulated by the PCC over the previous three
years.
The NPCC confirmed the role of the Chamber of Arbitration in (a) record-keeping of public contracts
arbitrators and experts, (b) curating the code for arbitration, and (c) appointing the third arbitrator in case
of disagreement between the parties and administrating the associated dispute.6
6 Professionals willing to be enter the arbitration list must apply to the Chamber, submitting a CV and any documentation
to be eligible. Pursuant to art. 242, paragraph 6 of the PPC, the following categories can be enrolled in the list of arbitrators
of the Chamber of Arbitration: (i) ordinary magistrates, accounting magistrates and State attorneys in service designated by
their competent body, as well as State attorneys and ordinary magistrates not in service; (ii) attorneys registered with ordinary
and special bars who are authorized to practice before superior courts who have the requisites for the appointment as counsellor
to the Court of Cassation; (iii) experts who have a college degree in engineering and architecture who are authorized to exercise
the profession for at least ten years and who are registered with the relative professional register; and (iv) tenured university
professors in legal and technical subjects and managers of the public administrations, holding the same degrees, with specific
skills in the field of public contracts for works, services and supplies.

4

3

Data

From the text of the contract disputes filed at the Chamber of Arbitration, we create a number of measurable
variables. First, we create three outcome variables. Each document includes the date that the dispute was
initiated and the date at which the award was announced. The number of days between these two makes up
our Duration variable. Second, the votes of the three arbitrators is recorded. We create an indicator variable
equal to one if they reach a unanimous decision; Unanimous. Third, we record the outcome (in Euros) of
the dispute; Award. We normalize this by the initial amount claimed. Thus, one can interpret the award
outcome as the proportion of the total dispute that is chosen. It is important to do this to disentangle the
relative “victory” of one party from the stakes involved, which will be included as a control variable Value.
A number of control variables are also derived. Since participation to a dispute involves both opportunity
costs and money, in the case of the private party we proxy the former with the variable Revenue; i.e., the
company’s average annual revenues over the three-year period before the dispute, and the latter with Equity;
i.e., the equity-to-asset ratio (= Net Worth/Total Assets) which captures the health of the company’s balance
sheet.
Further, we use the population of the municipality where the CA is located as a measure of the number
of individuals who are expected to benefit from the execution of the public contract, Population.7 Also, it
represents the size of the municipality, which proxies strong legal skills and the ability to draft comprehensive
contracts. Further, we control for the local environment where the municipality operates. We employ the
corruption index of Italian provinces as measured by Nifo and Vecchione [2014]. We expect that more corrupt
municipalities may experience more disputes and CAs in corrupt municipalities may be less efficient. Finally,
we create an indicator variable for whether the contract is for a public works project, Public Works.
Given our interest in exploring the role of expert witnesses, three additional variables are considered.
We create Expert Witness, which is equal to one if an outside expert witness was used in the arbitration
proceedings. Further, we create Open Tendering, which is equal to one if the municipality chose to use
an open awarding procedure. Finally, counting for each arbitration panel the number of members with a
technical background (like engineers and architects), we generate the variable Technical Panel. As discussed
in the upcoming section, we argue that these are valid instruments for the involvement of experts.

4

Identification Strategy

Our objective is to identify the causal impact of the use of an outside, expert witness on the outcome of an
arbitration proceeding. We consider three distinct outcome variables. The identification concern is that the
use of an outside expert is endogenous. The arbitrators choose to use an expert. It may very well be that
the circumstances under which one is chosen to be used may be causing the outcomes observed, rather than
the use of the expert directly.
7 Population

data comes from the Italian National Institute of Statistics.
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To deal with the endogeneity problem, we use an instrumental variables approach. Specifically, we will
use two instruments for the use of an expert witness: (i) the process by which the contractor was selected
by the CA; and (ii) the knowledge on technical aspects within the panel.
As described, contracting authorities have the discretion to have a competitive bidding process used to
take in proposals from different service providers in an open tendering procedure. Instead, they can directly
contract with a private enterprise to provide the public service using a restricted tendering process. We
argue that the open tendering procedure is highly correlated with the decision to use an expert witness in
an arbitration process if a dispute arises. While a contracting authority is more likely to use a restricted
tendering process when it has repeated business with a particular service provider, an open bidding process
is more likely to be used for relatively novel public projects. Therefore, the process used in selecting the
supplier is a measure of the uniqueness of the project. Consequently, when a dispute arises with the public
procurement contract, the dispute is more likely to involve new arrangements, non-typical projects, and other
concerns that are not easily accessible. It is these new circumstances that are expected to cause arbitrators
to be more interested in seeking out outside testimony.
Even the background of the members of the panel could be associated with the likelihood of using
an expert witness during the arbitration process. Although the panel might benefit from a mixture of
expertise, the great majority of the panelists are lawyers. Few have technical backgrounds such as property
development, construction, engineering, and architecture.8 This strong homogeneity creates the need to use
an expert witness in order to acquire knowledge on technical aspects of the case. For this reason, the number
of panelists coming from technical backgrounds is taken as a proxy of panel’s knowledge on this matter.
We feel that both the process used to select the service provider and the panel’s background are unlikely
to be directly associated with the outcome of the arbitration. There is no reason to believe that the manner
in which the contract and the panel were formed will affect how long it takes for arbitrators to reach a
decision in a dispute if one arises, how likely it is that the panel of arbitrators agree with each other on the
proper outcome of the dispute, and the relative success of the two parties to the dispute. These outcome
variables relate to the process led by the arbitrators. Thus, we argue that these instruments satisfy the
exclusion restriction.
Strong, suggestive evidence exists in the data. The left panel of Figure 1 compares the mean value of
the three outcome variables for those disputes that had contracts formed after an open tendering procedure
(light gray) and without an open tending procedure (dark gray). The right panel of Figure 1 compares the
mean value of the outcome variables for differing number of arbitrators on the panel that have technical
expertise.
The way in which each municipality selects its service provider is strongly unrelated with each of the
arbitration outcome variables. The same reasoning holds true for the number of technical expert panelists.
Thus, the exclusion restriction holds.
8 Nearly 98% of the disputes have at least a lawyer in the panel, while we observe at least a surveyor, engineer, or architect
in about the 15% of cases.
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Figure 1: Outcomes and Use of Open Tendering & Technical Experts
1.2
2
1

1.5
proportion

proportion

0.8

0.6

1

0.4
0.5
0.2

0

0
Duration

Award

Unanimous

Duration

Award

Unanimous

The left panel depicts the prevalence of the use of an open tendering process. The right panel depicts the use of technical
experts as arbitration panelists. In the left panel, the light gray columns represent mean of the sample of disputes with
an open tendering process. The dark gray columns present the mean of the sample of disputes without an open tendering
process. Duration is normalized by the (full sample) mean to allow for all three outcome variables to be presented on the
same figure. In the right panel, from left to right, the columns represent the mean of the sample of disputes with zero,
one, two, or three technical expert arbitrators on the panel, respectively. The 95% confidence intervals are depicted. For
the left panel, a two-tailed, difference-in-mean t-test between those with and those without an open, competitive tendering
procedure has t = −0.2115, t = 0.911, t = 0.715 for the three variables, respectively. Each has p > 0.1. A two-sample
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test is also performed for the three variables: z = −0.085, z = 0.217 and z = 0.716,
respectively. Again each has p > 0.1. Finally, a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions
for the three variables. Again each has p > 0.1. For the right panel, a multivariate test on means has F = 2.51, F = 0.20
and F = 0.68 for the three variables, respectively. Each has p > 0.06.

Further, there is evidence that we have a strong instrument. The left panel of Figure 2 depicts the
proportion of the observations where a expert witness is used. The sample is partitioned into those which
used an open tending process and those that did not. The right panel of Figure 2 does the same for the
composition of the arbitration panel.
Use of an open-tendering process is associated with a statistically significant reduction in the proportion
of observations which involve expert witnesses. In addition, there is a monotonically decreasing relationship
between the number of technical experts on the arbitration panel and the proportion of observations that
utilize expert witnesses. Therefore, we will use Open Tendering and Technical Panel as instruments for
Expert Witness. Initially, we estimate
Yirt = α1 ExpertW itnessirt + Xirt α + ρir + τit + ϵirt .

(1)

where Yirt is the outcome variable of interest (either duration, award, or unanimity) for observation i which
arises from a municipality in region r in year t. Xirt is all the control variables. We will include region fixed
effects to account for variation in economy, governance, and culture (to name a few) across the country and
year indicator variables to account for macroeconomic events or amendments to institutional features. This
naive OLS regression does not account for the endogeneity of the use of expert witnesses though. Hence, in
a first stage we estimate
ExpertW itnessirt = β1 T echnicalP anelirt + β2 OpenT enderingirt + Xirt β + ρir + τit + ϵirt .
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(2)

Figure 2: Open Tendering and Use of Experts
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In the left panel, the first column is the proportion of disputes that use an expert witness in the arbitration proceedings
arising from contracts formed with an open tending procedure (N = 148). The second column is the proportion of disputes
that use an expert witness in the arbitration proceedings arising from contracts formed with without an open tendering
procedure (N = 66). In the right panel, each column represents the proportion of disputes that use an expert witness
in the arbitration proceedings arising from panels formed with zero (N = 180), one (N = 25), two (N = 6), or three
(N = 3) technical panelists, respectively. The 95% confidence intervals are depicted. For the right panel, a two-tailed,
difference-in-mean t-test has t = 1.943 with p = 0.053. For the right panel, a multivariate test on means has F = 3.86 with
p = 0.010.

Unfortunately, the instrument Open Tendering suffers from missing observations. Information on how the
contract was originally formed is missing for 47 cases. As a matter of precaution, we attribute them to the
non-open tendering procedure group. However, two robustness checks are here proposed. First, we move
these observations to the group of open tendering procedure, giving a value of one to them. Second, we
rerun the analysis without these missing values. Our main findings hold in both cases.

5

Results

First, we establish our main finding that the use of an expert witness slows down the arbitration process.
Table 1 presents the results with Y = Duration.
The naive OLS regression, (1), reports a positive and highly statistically-significant relationship between
the use of an expert witness and the duration of the arbitration proceeding. This represents an increase in
the duration by more than

5
6 ths

of a standard deviation. This finding is robust to using the process used

to form the contract as an instrument. Missing values in Open Tendering instrument are imputed to open
procedure (2), non-open procedure (3), or omitted (4).
From the first stage, as expected, the open tendering process is positively related to the use an expert
witnesses, while the number of technical expert panelists reduces the likelihood of its use. These effects
are statistically significant. Along with the large F -statistic, this suggests we have strong instruments.
Consistent with Figure 2 an open, competitive process and the presence of technical expert panelists are
highly associated with the use of expert witnesses. As a robustness check, we employ one instrument at a
time, re-running Equation 2 using only T echnical P anel or Open T endering. Although the main results
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Expert Witness
Value
Revenue
Equity
Population
Corruption Index
Public Works

Table 1: Duration
(1)
(2)
OLS
IV
(naive)
(2SLS)
0.505 ***
0.453 **
(0.0630)
(0.216)
0.0395 *
0.0420 **
(0.0205)
(0.0201)
-0.00365
-0.00360
(0.00654)
(0.00605)
0.000325
0.000418
(0.000514) (0.000544)
-0.0261 ** -0.0262 **
(0.0123)
(0.0111)
-0.727 *** -0.716 ***
(0.148)
(0.224)
0.158 **
0.152 **
(0.0781)
(0.0759)

(3)
IV
(2SLS)
0.494 **
(0.243)
0.0400 *
(0.0211)
-0.00364
(0.00613)
0.000344
(0.000566)
-0.0261 **
(0.0109)
-0.725 ***
(0.229)
0.157 **
(0.0752)

(4)
IV
(2SLS)
0.479 **
(0.192)
0.0504 **
(0.0211)
-0.00865
(0.00928)
0.000592
(0.000521)
-0.0208 *
(0.0117)
-0.751 **
(0.334)
-0.0402
(0.126)

Year Controls?
Region Fixed Effects?

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

R2
Obs.

0.651
214

0.650
214

0.651
214

0.652
167

-0.241 ***
(0.050)
0.228 **
(0.083)
0.056
11.394 **
1.015

-0.221 ***
(0.053)
0.290 **
(0.128)
0.053
9.766 **
1.021

-0.285 ***
(0.048)
0.305 **
(0.140)
0.001
13.881 **
1.753

First Stage Results
Technical Panel
Open Tendering
Rob. test of endogeneity
Eff. F statistic test
Sargan test

Dependent variable is the number of days between the filing of the dispute and its resolution (log transformed). The variables
Value, Revenue, and Population are all log transformed. All disputes between 2007 and 2020 included; N = 214. Robust
standard errors presented in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The bottom panel presents the results from the
first-stage estimation. The 2SLS estimations in (2), (3) and (4) use Value, Revenue, Population (each log transformed),
Capitalization Index, Corruption Index, Public Works, year indicators and region fixed effects as other instruments. Missing
values in Open Tendering instrument are imputed to open procedure, (1) and (2), non-open procedure, (3), or omitted
(4). The effective F -statistic test is the weak-instrument test by Montiel Olea and Pflueger [2013] under the null of weak
instruments for a weak-instrument threshold of τ = 10%.
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still hold, we observe that the effective F-test on weak instruments cannot be rejected. This is an indication
that the two instruments are not strong enough when used separately, supporting the results of Table 1.
Turning to the arbitrator’s decision, it is reasonable to ask whether the use of an expert tends to favor
one side over another. Table 2 duplicates the results presented in the top panel of Table 1, but uses Award
as the dependent variable.
There is no consistent relationship between the use of an expert and the award made by the arbitrators.
In fact, the sign switches when expertise is instrumented for with the number of technical experts in the panel
and the tendering process used to form the contract, column (2). This result still holds in the robustness
check, columns (3) and (4). Ultimately, we take this as inconclusive evidence of an effect on the award.
Further, we consider the results with the uncertainty amongst the arbitrators as the dependent variable
of interest. Table 3 presents the results.
Across the specifications, the use of an expert is unrelated with agreement amongst the three arbitrators.
Taken together, the use of an expert witness, which is employed at the discretion of the arbitrators selected
to resolve the dispute, slows down the speed at which a decision is reached but does not have a measurable
effect on the outcome of the arbitration or agreement existing between the arbitrators.
As discussed previously, a portion of our disputes cannot be readily coded as being restricted in the
tendering process. Thus, our instrument used in the three tables puts the open tendered contracts with the
unclassifiable contracts together as our instrument, with the unclassified added to the restricted into a “notopen” category, our results are unaffected. The instrument is highly statistically significant and maintains a
large F -stat in the first stage, while the duration is still extended with a change in the award or unanimity
of the vote. Finally, missing values are omitted as a further robustness check. First stage statistics and main
findings still hold. Thus, our result is not sensitive to the measurement of our instrument.

6

Conclusion

Economic exchange requires dispute resolution mechanisms. Their design must trade off accuracy in decisions
with the costs. As market participants can be expected to differ in the relative importance of these two
considerations, a uniform public court system is unlikely to be preferable in all contracting environments.
Hence, arbitration serves as an alternative for those who value cost mitigation relatively more. Arbitration
mechanisms, though, leave important discretionary decisions to the arbitrators. This opens up the possibility
of a principal-agent problem as they may find greater benefits to high-cost, prolonged disputes that search
for the most accurate decision. We explore this concern in a data set of public procurement contract disputes
in Italy. Italy, in particular, suffers from a slow public court system and, hence, arbitration is potentially
valuable. An important discretionary decision within arbitration is whether expert witnesses are hired to
testify in these cases.
Using an instrumental-variables approach we identify the causal impact of the use of expert witnesses.
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Expert Witness
Value
Revenue
Equity
Population
Corruption Index
Public Works

Table
(1)
OLS
(naive)
0.0469
(0.0801)
-0.0391 **
(0.0155)
0.00322
(0.00728)
0.000854 ***
(0.000224)
0.0127
(0.0125)
0.242
(0.177)
0.0627
(0.0630)

2: Award
(2)
IV
(2SLS)
-0.0179
(0.142)
-0.0361 ***
(0.0135)
0.00328
(0.00576)
0.000969 ***
(0.000355)
0.0125
(0.00847)
0.256
(0.274)
0.0553
(0.0672)

(3)
IV
(2SLS)
0.0624
(0.140)
-0.0398 ***
(0.0135)
0.00321
(0.00568)
0.000827 **
(0.000370)
0.0127
(0.00853)
0.239
(0.271)
0.0645
(0.0655)

(4)
IV
(2SLS)
0.0311
(0.116)
-0.0498 ***
(0.0136)
0.0159***
(0.00562)
0.000903 ***
(0.000277)
0.0128
(0.00954)
0.166
(0.340)
0.0183
(0.116)

Year Controls?
Region Fixed Effects?

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

R2
Obs.

0.231
214

0.224
214

0.231
214

0.270
167

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

First Stage
Technical Panel
Open Tendering

Dependent variable is the size of the arbitral award, normalized by the total value of the dispute. The variables Value,
Revenue, and Population are all log transformed. The 2SLS estimations in (2), (3), and (4) use Value, Revenue, Population
(each log transformed), Capitalization Index, Corruption Index, Public Works, year indicators and region fixed effects as
other instruments. Missing values in Open Tendering instrument are imputed to open procedure, (1) and (2), non-open
procedure, (3), or omitted, (4). Robust standard errors presented in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Expert Witness
Value
Revenues
Equity
Population
Corruption Index
Public Works

Table 3: Uncertainty
(1)
(2)
OLS
IV
(naive)
(2SLS)
-0.0635
-0.0139
(0.0698)
(0.194)
0.00313
0.000806
(0.0185)
(0.0196)
-0.00169
-0.00174
(0.00624)
(0.00560)
-0.000721
-0.000809
(0.000699) (0.000706)
0.00728
0.00745
(0.0117)
(0.0105)
-0.186
-0.196
(0.257)
(0.227)
-0.0357
-0.0300
(0.0781)
(0.0706)

(3)
IV
(2SLS)
0.0504
(0.189)
-0.00221
(0.0198)
-0.00180
(0.00556)
-0.000923
(0.000733)
0.00767
(0.0104)
-0.210
(0.225)
-0.0226
(0.0722)

(4)
IV
(2SLS)
-0.0339
(0.153)
0.0208
(0.0212)
0.00123
(0.0113)
-0.000871
(0.000679)
0.00466
(0.0130)
0.0283
(0.203)
0.0455
(0.105)

Year Controls?
Region Fixed Effects?

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

R2
Obs.

0.155
214

0.152
214

0.139
214

0.225
167

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

First Stage
Technical Panel
Open Tendering

Dependent variable is equal to one if the arbitrators made a unanimous decision. The variables Value, Revenue, and
Population are all log transformed. The 2SLS estimations in (2), (3), and (4) use Value, Revenue, Population (each
log transformed), Capitalization Index, Corruption Index, Public Works, year indicators and region fixed effects as other
instruments. Missing values in Open Tendering instrument are imputed to open procedure, (1) and (2), non-open procedure,
(3), or omitted, (4). Robust standard errors presented in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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We show that the speed at which a dispute is resolved, an important measurement of arbitration costs, slows
down considerably when the arbitrators’ choose to bring in expert witnesses. Further, we show that the use
of experts has no measurable impact on the arbitral award decided nor does it have a consistent impact on
the uncertainty of the proceedings, as proxied by a unanimous vote by the panel of arbitrators. Thus, the
use of expert witnesses in these cases creates costs without a measurable benefit.
While it is difficult to assess accuracy, the expectation is that the use of these expert witnesses improves
the correctness of the decisions. The implication of our finding is that if institutional designers are interested
in providing an alternative mechanism to publicly-provided courts that economizes on the deadweight loss
created by conflict, they may want to consider the incentives of the arbitrators and whether they align with
the goals of the disputants.
Our observation complements previous analysis on the incentive effects created by arbitration mechanism
design decisions, but there are a few limitations worth acknowledging. For one, we only observe disputes
that make their way to the arbitration tribunal. We do not know how many disputes were resolved privately
through contract renegotiations. It is possible that the expert’s use affects pre-arbitration bargaining. Further, contract authorities choose whether to include a clause in the original contract that requires a dispute,
if it were to arise, to be taken to arbitration. Ultimately, our results are conditioned on the dispute occurring
in a contract that requires arbitration that is not privately resolved. Nevertheless, we feel it is unlikely that
these selection effects will negate our findings.
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